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Weekly Survey of Communist Military Developments in Indochina

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27 February 1974

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27 February 1974

Fifty-Second Report

WEEKLY SURVEY OF COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA*

(This report covers the period from 21 through 26 February)

The Key Points

- Troop infiltration was maintained at a steady pace during the period, as three regular groups were detected moving south -- two destined for the COSVN area and one bound for the central highlands.
- Logistic activity in North Vietnam continued at a normal, high dry season level, while in Laos and South Vietnam photography showed only moderate truck traffic along the main supply corridors.
- Major elements of an NVA antiaircraft artillery regiment probably have relocated from Quang Tri Province to Quang Binh Province in North Vietnam. Advanced elements of an NVA artillery regiment that formerly operated in northern Laos have been detected in northern MR 1.
- The Communists are building a new north-south road through Pleiku and Darlac Provinces of South Vietnam, paralleling the Route 14 corridor.

^{*} This report, which replaces the weekly Communist Violations of the Vietnam and Laos Settlement Agreements and Related Developments, has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

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Preface

This report is the fifty-second in a series summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) significant Communist combat activity, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

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DETAILS

I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies

Personnel Infiltration

1. The North Vietnamese continued to send troops south last week, as three new regular infiltration groups were detected moving through Binh Tram (BT) 8 near Vinh, North Vietnam. Two of the groups, with about 1,100 troops, are destined for the COSVN area, and the third, comprising more than 500 troops, is en route to the B-3 Front — the first noted moving to this area in about three weeks. Based on "gap-filling," another undetected group with an estimated strength of 500 troops is believed to have started, or soon will start, to the B-3 Front. This group, as well as the three groups observed moving south in the infiltration pipeline, have been included in our compilation of troops starting south during the 1973-74 regular infiltration cycle (see the table below). In addition, two new special-purpose groups were detected at BT 8 during the past week—one destined for VC MR 5 on the central coast and the other en route to the COSVN area.

Comparative Starts of Troops from North Vietnam, by Destination 1 September - 26 February

	1972-73	1973-74
Total	78,500	54,000
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	19,500	2,000
MR 5	9,000	3,000
B-3 Front	14,000	6,500
COSVN	25,000	20,000
Southern Laos/MR 559	11,000	22,500

2. Thus far in February, 15 regular infiltration groups with some 8,000 troops have started toward or have been committed to infiltrate South Vietnam. This rate is consistent with a 30 January message from BT 8 instructing its subordinate elements to prepare to receive, process, and transport "one group every two days and in some instances daily." On the other hand, the 7,000 troops starting toward the B-3 Front and COSVN is substantially below the monthly rate of about 11,000 forecast for these areas in a North Vietnamese message last November.

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positions in Quang Duc apparently has been sufficiently reduced to permit the withdrawal of the 174th. This redeployment represents about a 1,000-man reduction in Communist forces in MR 2 and a similar augmentation in MR 3 (see the map on Communist and South Vietnamese combat forces in South Vietnam).

Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

North Vietnam

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6. Logistic activity in central North Vietnam remained at a normal, high dry season level during the reporting period. One storage area north of Vinh reportedly handled some 400 tons of ordnance during while another storage area reported that it had nearly 350 tons waiting to be shipped. 350 tons waiting to be shipped. shipments from Vinh westward along Route 7 for Communist forces in northern Laos. 30 tons of supplies, including small amounts of ordnance, were moved westward along Route 7, while the following day another 80 tons were dispatched. Farther south, in the area between Quang Khe and the DMZ, no significant logistic activity was noted.	25X1 25X1 25X1
7. Most of the ordnance identified moving through the system during this period consisted of ammunition for small arms, antiaircraft artillery pieces, and mortars. Only 10 tons of ammunition for heavy field artillery pieces (122-mm and 130-mm) were detected. where only a small proportion – less than 10% – of the ammunition identified has been for heavy field artillery pieces. Moreover, a large part of the 130-mm ammunition that has been shipped from the Vinh area – about 250 tons – has been destined for Communist units in northern Laos. The shipment of only small quantities of heavy field artillery ammunition is consistent with the level of activity in South Vietnam. During the past year the Communists have used their heavy artillery pieces very sparingly and do not need large shipments to maintain their stocks. **Laos**	25X1 25X1
8. only light to moderate truck activity. Following the	25X11 25X1
pattern established last week, an average of less than 50 trucks was observed moving south daily, although on most days only sections of the main north-south supply corridor were covered. The only significant supply shipment detected by this source occurred when a logistics unit reported that 34 vehicles carrying rice and building materials had been received. The unit also stated that it was expecting to receive another 115 trucks shortly.	25X1 25X1 25X1

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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam South Vietnam MR I Regular Combat Forces 17 VII RIVIE 17CN1.41 $RVNAF^2$ 86,000 Thien 103,000 Quanc 186,000 372,000 325th VNMC Nam €24B Airhorne 304th 1st Quang Tin 711th 2nd $2nd^3$ 3rd Quang 673rd AAA Regional Ngai Forces 1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground Kontum combat, combat support, and air defense units and MR 2 local force companies and platoons. 2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes Binh Dinh ICATA RVNAFassigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional 37,000 78,000 Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to Pleiku 320th 23rd be about 85% of assigned strength. 10th22nd Only one infantry regiment subordinate to Phu Bon the division. 3rdRegional MR 3 Forces FCNVARIVIT Darlac 39,000 94,000 Khanh Hos 25th 9th Queng Duc 18th 7th 5th 5th Phuoc Ninh Duc Regional 377th AAA Long am Dong Forces 429th Sap Cmd Tay Ninh 69th Arty Cmd Long Khanh MR 4 VC/NVA RVNAF97,000 24,000 $1st^3$ 21st (Kian Giana) 9th K en 7th Giang Regional Forces Military region boundary Province boundary ICCS region boundary

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
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5-) 75 K lometers

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South Vietnam	
Route 9 and Communist showed these roads to be in good condition and capable of sustaining heavy traffic. Coverage of Route 9 from Dong Ha to the Laotian border indicates that all bridges along this road are usable and that the major storage areas at Cam Lo adjacent to Route 9 are receiving extensive use, suggesting that substantial quantities of supplies are moving along this road into Laos. However, only small truck convoys, usually less than 5 trucks, were observed moving.	25X1 25X1
10. South of Khe Sanh along Communist Route 14, photography also showed only small truck convoys. Like Route 9, the roads in the area appear to be capable of supporting much heavier levels of truck activity	25X1
II. Significant Communist Combat Activity	
11. Combat activity in South Vietnam remained high during the past week, with a daily average incident rate of over 100. This represents a slight decline from the previous week, which had witnessed the greatest number of cease-fire violations in 1974. The activity continues to be centered in the Delta (MR 4) and consists primarily of low-level ground contacts and attacks-by-fire. A few heavy clashes have recently occurred in the U Minh forest, however, as a result of ARVN sweep operations into this Communist-controlled area.	
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina	
Communists Expanding Roadnet in Western Highlands	
12. Aerial photography shows that Communist road crews are building a new north-south route paralleling the Route 14 corridor through Pleiku and Darlac Provinces, South Vietnam. About 43 miles of recently graded single-lane construction aligned along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border about five miles from Route 14 were observed on the photography (see the transportation map).	25X1
13. The new road probably will be extended another 26 miles northward to join Route 19 and another 9 miles farther south to connect with the recently completed single-lane road which joins Communist Route 14 with Route 14 in Cambodia. It probably is being built to provide security for the Route 14 corridor and to function as an alternative route in the event that ARVN operations to interdict Route 14 succeed.	
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